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Equity Analysis and Natural Hazards Policy 
Matthew D. Adler, University of Pennsylvania Law School1
Forthcoming in Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl, and Howard Kunreuther, eds., ON RISK AND 
DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) 
 
 A standard claim in the natural hazards literature is that natural hazards policy should be 
sensitive to equity concerns.   (Mileti 1999, 6; Berke et al. 1993; Cochrane 1975; Heinz Center 
2000, 51; Kunreuther and Rose 2004, xxiv).  Is this true?  Is equity really a normative 
consideration that is distinct from efficiency or overall well-being?  Assuming it is, what does 
equity mean?  Is equity group-based or individualistic?  And, if the latter, what is equity’s 
“currency”?  Does equity concern the distribution of income, of fatality risk, of well-being 
generally, or perhaps of some other item?  Further, is individualistic equity comparative or 
noncomparative?  Is the idea to equalize the distribution of income/risk/well-being across the 
population, or rather to give priority to those who have lower levels of income/risk/well-being? 
 These are very general, abstract questions but are crucial to the design of natural hazards 
policy.  For example, if equity is not a distinct consideration, then cost-benefit analysis should 
probably be the exclusive policymaking tool here.  If it is, then cost-benefit analysis will need to 
be supplemented by an additional tool – an “equity analysis” – which will rank possible policies 
in terms of equity.  And the appropriate structure of equity analysis will depend on deep and 
difficult questions about the nature of equity.2
                                                 
1 Many thanks to Paul Dolan for his comments. 
2 To be sure, choices by administrative agencies that address natural hazards, such as FEMA, are constrained by 
statutes and other legal mandates.  The general normative framework elaborated here is relevant to agencies in 
exercising the discretion accorded them by their legal mandates, and to Congress in shaping those mandates.  Moral 
rights are also plausibly part of the normative framework, along with overall well-being and equity, but presumably 
are less applicable to natural rather than human hazards policymaking.  In any event, my claims about the content of 
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 This paper will consider those questions in a preliminary way, suggesting that equity is a 
distinct consideration additional to efficiency/overall well-being and that it is individualistic; that 
its focus is ex post not ex ante; that the “currency” for equity should be well-being; and that, at a 
minimum, equity analysis should focus on avoiding “poverty” (meaning a serious deprivation 
with respect to any component of well-being, not merely income poverty). Concretely, this 
means that equity analysis for natural hazards policy should be focused on reducing death, 
serious physical injury, psychological trauma, homelessness, hunger, social exclusion, and other 
grave harms to human welfare. 
 My account of equity may surprise natural hazards scholars – at least if they look to 
scholarship on “human hazards” (toxins, radiation, dangerous technology, and other hazards that 
result from human activities and do not involve extreme natural events).  Human hazards 
scholarship often adopts a very different conceptualization of equity than that proposed here – 
using fatality risks rather than well-being generally as its currency, and adopting an ex ante 
rather than ex post view. The account I propose is much closer to the conception of distributive 
justice adopted by a body of scholarship that has recently emerged in development economics.  
This literature, inspired by the work of the revisionary economist Amartya Sen, attempts to 
measure poverty using a plurality of “functionings” – in effect, aspects of well-being or readily 
measurable proxies for these aspects. 
In principle, equity analysis as I propose it should inform all aspects of natural hazards 
policy: not only mitigation policy but also choices about how to structure preparedness, response 
and recovery. Of course, decision-cost considerations may limit the scope for full-blown equity 
analysis (as they do for cost-benefit analysis itself).  (Adler and Posner 1999)  Still, it is 
                                                                                                                                                             
equity are independent of whether the general framework for natural hazards policy is bipartite, including just 
overall well-being and equity, or tripartite, including both of those plus moral rights. 
 2
important to get a sense of what a full-blown equity analysis for natural hazards policy would 
involve. 
 Efficiency/Overall Well-Being and Equity 
 Economists tend to think that governmental policy should be sensitive both to efficiency 
concerns and to equity concerns.  By “efficiency” economists mean “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.”  
A policy is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if, in principle, those whom it benefits could fully compensate 
those whom it harms.  The technique of cost-benefit analysis is seen, by economists, as a tool for 
identifying Kaldor-Hicks efficient policies. (Just et al. 2004, 1-13) 
 In my own work, I have taken issue with the economists’ normative picture, arguing that 
the relevant standard is not Kaldor-Hicks efficiency but rather overall well-being.  For practical 
purposes, however, the difference between Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and overall well-being is not 
huge.  The two criteria significantly overlap, and both are best implemented through cost-benefit 
analysis.  (Adler and Posner 2006; Adler and Posner 2001; Adler 2000; Adler and Posner 1999) 
 In other words, whether the underlying normative framework is efficiency plus equity 
(the framework of many economists) or overall well-being plus equity (the replacement 
framework I would defend), cost-benefit analysis should be part of the decisionmaking apparatus 
for administrative policymaking – including natural hazards policy.  Cost-benefit analysis 
implements the first term in the framework – be it efficiency or overall well-being.  
 Cost-benefit analysis is now routinely used outside the area of natural hazards, for 
example by the Environmental Protection Agency in regulating pollutants.  (Adler and Posner 
1999, 169-76; Morgenstern 1997).  And it has long been employed for certain aspects of natural 
hazards policy, for example by the Army Corps of Engineers in designing flood-control 
structures.   FEMA, the chief federal natural hazards agency, has been relatively slow to adopt 
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cost-benefit analysis  -- perhaps because the Presidential cost-benefit orders, in place since the 
Reagan administration, have required an agency to prepare a full analysis only when it acts by 
regulation and issues a sufficiently major rule.  (Exec. Order 12,866; Exec. Order 12,291).  It 
seems that FEMA, unlike EPA, rarely (if ever) meets this standard. 
 To be sure, cost-benefit analysis of natural hazards policy raises many difficult problems.   
(Kunreuther and Rose 2004; Benson and Clay 2004; Committee on Assessing the Costs of 
Natural Disasters 1999; Ewing et al. 2005; Heinz Center 2000; Mechler 2003; Yezer 2002) 
How should nonmarket goods be valued?  What about indirect rather than direct costs –  for 
example, the ripple effects on the general economy that occur when a flood, hurricane, or 
earthquake hits one location?  Should the cost-benefit analysis simply aggregate willingness-to-
pay amounts: the traditional technique? Or should these be adjusted to reflect the variable 
marginal utility of money?   Much more work on these matters needs to be undertaken.  But 
there is no reason to think that they are insoluble, or even particularly murky.  The questions are 
the same as, or at least similar to, those that arise in other policy areas – for example, 
environmental law -- where cost-benefit analysis has proceeded apace.  Further, the overall 
structure of cost-benefit analysis is clear: summing (adjusted or unadjusted) willingness-to-pay 
amounts as a way to test whether policies are Kaldor-Hicks efficient or increase overall well-
being. 
 By contrast, the second term in the efficiency/overall well-being plus equity framework 
remains extremely murky.  There is zero consensus within economics about the meaning of 
equity.  Often the concept is seen as being irreducibly subjective, by contrast with efficiency – a 
matter for political choice rather than normative argument.  (Just 2004, 10)  The current 
Presidential cost-benefit order tells agencies to take account of “equity” and “distributive 
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impacts” in choosing policies, rather than relying exclusively on cost-benefit analysis, but neither 
the order nor OMB’s guidance documents takes a position about the meaning of equity.  
(Executive Order 12,866; Office of Management and Budget 2003) 
 There is no reason to think that equity is necessarily subjective and political.  Just as 
normative argument might persuade us that efficiency/overall well-being has normative 
significance, so it might persuade us that equity also does, and that equity has a particular 
content.  To be sure, in a democratic system, any policy choice or policy-analytic tool (such as 
cost-benefit analysis or equity analysis) is subject to being overridden by a legislative mandate – 
but normative analysis can help shape legislative mandates, and can help structure administrative 
policy in default of a legislative mandate.   
 Does Equity Matter? 
 So we are led to the topic of this paper: which view of equity for natural hazards policy is 
most supportable, as a matter of normative argument?  To begin, is the most attractive normative 
framework one that contains equity as a separate normative consideration, additional to 
efficiency/overall well-being? 
 To see the force of this question, consider the following point – a familiar point in the 
literature on tax policy.  Maximizing overall well-being might require equalizing the distribution 
of income.  Assume that money has declining marginal utility.  The increment of well-being that 
a given individual reaps from his first dollar of income is larger than the increment he reaps from 
the second, which in turn is larger than the increment he reaps from the third, and so on.  Further, 
assume that two individuals P and Q have the same utility function3, and that P is richer than Q.  
                                                 
3 In this paper, I generally use the term “utility” to mean an interpersonally comparable measure of well-being.  
Well-being is interpersonally comparable and, if certain axioms are satisfied, is measurable. (Adler and Posner 
2006)  To be sure, policy analysts currently tend not to employ utility scales, preferring money or other scales which 
are easier to use.  
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Then (bracketing incentive effects) transferring income from P to Q increases well-being.  In this 
sort of case we can justify income distribution without positing an equity factor in our normative 
framework additional to the factor of overall well-being. 
 A similar point is suggested by the literature on the special “vulnerability” of the poor 
and other groups to natural hazards.  (Fothergill and Peek 2004; Fothergill et al. 1999; Heinz 
Center 2000, 114-19; Mileti 1999, 122-25; Morrow 1999; Peacock et al. 1997; Wisner et al. 
2004).  As one review article summarizes this literature with respect to socioeconomic status: 
[S]ocioeconomic status is a significant predictor in the pre- and post-disaster stages, as 
well as for the physical and psychological impacts [of disasters].  The poor are more 
likely to perceive hazards as risky; less likely to prepare for hazards or buy insurance; 
less likely to respond to warnings; more likely to die, suffer injuries, and have 
proportionately higher material losses; have more psychological trauma; and face more 
obstacles during the phases of response, recovery, and reconstruction.  (Fothergill and 
Peek 2004). 
These findings are extremely plausible.  For example, because the poor tend to live in lower cost, 
less sturdy housing, poor individuals who fail to evacuate are likelier to incur fatal or nonfatal 
injuries in building collapses than wealthier individuals.  Note, however, that this sort of 
asymmetry between the effects of disasters on the rich and the poor does not demonstrate that 
natural hazards policy needs to be sensitive to equity.  Rather it suggests that, even if 
policymakers care only about maximizing welfare, some degree of special attention to the poor 
may well be justified.  For example, if the policy choice presented is whether to spend limited 
mitigation funds in subsidizing building upgrades in poor or rich neighborhoods, the welfare-
maximizing choice might well be the former.   The risk of building collapse is larger in the 
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former case and therefore the expected welfare benefit, in the form of avoided injuries and 
fatalities, that would result from upgrading buildings to the point where the risk of collapse is 
zero or de minimis, is also larger. 
 The point generalizes beyond poverty.  Another recent review of the “vulnerability” 
literature points to a variety of groups that are particularly likely to be harmed by natural 
disasters.  (Morrow 1999, 10) 
        Highly Vulnerable Groups  
-- residents of group living facilities -- ethnic minorities (by language) 
-- elderly, particularly frail elderly -- recent residents/immigrants/migrants 
-- physically or mentally disabled -- large households 
-- renters -- large concentrations of children/youth 
-- poor households -- the homeless 
-- women-headed households -- transients 
  
The author suggests that disaster planners in each community should maintain a “community 
vulnerability inventory” showing where these vulnerable groups are concentrated, and that 
preparedness, response, recovery and/or mitigation activities should, to some extent, be targeted 
at them.   If indeed members of some such group are particularly vulnerable to a given natural 
hazard – in other words, the expected welfare harm to them if that hazard occurs is especially 
high – then preparedness, response, recovery and/or mitigation dollars have a greater impact 
when expended to reduce their exposure to the hazard than when expended to achieve an 
equivalent reduction in the exposure of the average community member.  
In other words, just as a welfare-maximization criterion plus the declining marginal 
utility of money can justify income redistribution to the poor, so a welfare-maximization 
criterion plus the heightened vulnerability of group G to natural hazards can justify 
“redistribution” of governmental efforts to protect citizens from natural hazards to the members 
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of G. Equity isn’t necessary to justify hazards policymakers in making special efforts to protect 
vulnerable groups; indeed, if our intuitions that the group members deserve extra concern can be 
borne out without invoking the fuzzy concept of equity, why invoke it? 
 Ironically, then, the “vulnerability” literature might move us away from an equity-
inclusive framework for regulating hazards, and towards utilitarianism.  But such a move should 
probably be resisted.  It is fair to say that most modern scholarship in moral philosophy rejects 
utilitarianism – in other words, rejects the view that makes overall welfare the sole morally 
relevant consideration.  (Kagan 1998)  Why listen to the moral philosophers?  Unlike many 
economists, philosophers have embraced the notion – the notion I want to entertain here – that 
problems of equity are problems for serious analysis and argument.   (Rawls 1971; Dworkin 
2000; Nagel 1991; Sen 1992; Temkin 1993; Arneson 2000; Clayton and Williams 2000; Pojman 
and Westmoreland 1997) And the upshot of modern philosophical work has generally been to 
recognize some role for equity.  
 Why?  At the risk of wildly oversimplifying, let me suggest that two themes emerge in 
the philosophical literature.  One is the theme of fairness – a central theme, for example, in John 
Rawls’ work.  Imagine that we work together in some common enterprise – a kitchen garden for 
the neighborhood, digging a common well, or, more grandly, sailing from the old world to the 
new and setting up a new society.  Then if we make equal efforts we should share equally in the 
gains from the enterprise, or proportionately if our contributions are unequal.  If you and I have 
made equal contributions then we’re entitled to the same share of the social product even if our 
utility functions are shaped and positioned such that giving you more would increase overall 
well-being. 
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 The second theme is one of urgency and need.  Change the hypothetical and assume that 
neither you nor I have made any contributions to the project.  Perhaps we’ve arrived too late on 
the scene.  The garden has already been planted, the well already dug, the new world settled.  But 
we could each benefit from the project, and the contributors are prepared to share some of it with 
us if they are morally obliged to do so.  You’re in a state of deprivation; I’m not.  You’re 
famished, or dehydrated, or about to be killed by pirates. I have my own supplies, or my own 
protection, although things would be easier for me if I could share in the common food, water, or 
protection.  In this sort of case many have the intuition that the contributors have a distinctive 
moral obligation or reason to help you, not me.  Note that overall welfare can’t explain that 
intuition, since both of us would benefit from the common stuff.  As a matter of overall welfare 
or efficiency, the distinction between us can only be quantitative, not qualitative. 
 So intuitions about fairness and urgency provide a strong tug towards equity.  And 
normative analysis, in turn, is (in part) a matter of intuitions – of constructing a theory that is 
both reasonably coherent and systematic and fits reasonably well with our intuitions.  (Daniels 
1996)  Utilitarianism is highly systematic but, for many, quite counterintuitive.  A pluralistic 
view that incorporates both overall welfare and equity as separate factors is a bit messier than 
utilitarianism, but better coheres with intuitions that demand redistribution of resources to those 
who are entitled to them as a matter of fairness, or desperately need them, even in the teeth of 
welfare maximization.  And a pluralist view of this sort need not be super messy.  For example, 
the view might be unified through the currency of well-being.  Overall welfare demands the 
maximization of well-being.  And equity could demand an appropriate distribution of well-being, 
or of the constituents or preconditions of well-being, such as food, shelter, health, and income. 
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 This is no more than a sketch of an argument in favor of equity.  The skeptical reader is 
advised to consult the scholarship that I have breezily summarized and to reach her own 
conclusions.  But I hope she’ll at least concede that an equity-regarding view is plausible and 
that it is worth some reflection to determine what the equity component of such a view would 
involve. 
 Is Equity Group-Based or Individualistic? 
  Equity might be group-based or individualistic.  A individualistic view focuses on the 
distribution of some currency (income, other aspects of well-being, risks to well-being, etc.) 
among individuals; a group-based view focuses on the distribution of some currency among 
groups. 
 Group-based views, at first blush, may seem thoroughly wacky.  Why even waste our 
time considering them?  But in fact some of the views of equity proposed by the natural hazards 
literature, or the related body of scholarship that studies human hazards, turn out to be group-
based views.  One important example are views that seek geographic equity.  Here, the idea is 
that different geographic areas should have equal impacts (in some sense) from human or natural 
hazards.  Concretely, this might mean siting hazardous waste dumps so that each geographic 
jurisdiction has the same number of dumps, or the same total chemical exposure.  (Been 1993) 
 A parallel geographic-equity account for natural hazards policy can readily be constructed: for 
example, mitigating some category of hazard so that the number of hazard events, or total deaths, 
or total economic costs, or percentage of the population affected by hazards, for each geographic 
jurisdiction, is equalized.  (Cross 2001; Cutter 2001) 
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 A different kind of group-based view, pressed by the so-called “environmental justice” 
literature, focuses on the allocation of chemical and technological risks among racial groups.4   
(Rechtschaffen and Gauna 2002)  Siting decisions for hazardous waste sites and other polluting 
activities that have a disparate impact on racial minorities are seen to be especially problematic 
by this literature – a view that is endorsed by the President’s Environmental Justice Order and by 
EPA’s guidance statements regarding Title VI.   (Executive Order 12,898;  Mank 2000) Once 
more, one can readily imagine a race-based analogue for natural hazards policy.  Natural hazards 
that disparately impact racial minorities (for example, hurricanes or earthquakes in cities with 
especially large minority populations) should receive higher priority; mitigation policies that fail 
to attend to such hazards, but instead disparately benefit whites (for example, tornado-mitigation 
policies or other policies that would benefit rural areas outside the South, which are 
disproportionately white) should be viewed more skeptically. 
 What to make of these or other group-based views?  Consider first geographic views.  
Certain variants of geographic equity turn out to be equivalent to plausible individualistic views.  
In particular, if we normalize by each jurisdiction’s population, then equalizing total fatalities per 
jurisdiction is effectively the same as equalizing individual fatality risks across the entire 
population.  But other variants of geographic equity – for example, equalizing the total number 
of hazard events or total hazard damage per state (without normalization), or equalizing the 
percentage of each state’s population affected by natural hazards -- are genuinely group-based.  
Why, as a normative matter, should equity in one of these senses be a concern?  If the equitable 
distribution of natural hazard impacts across individuals is preserved, why should it matter that 
                                                 
4 The “environmental justice” literature also discusses socioeconomic (SES) skews in exposure to human hazards.  
Since an SES group-based equity view is clearly quite close to an individualistic equity view – since all equity 
theorists should agree that redistribution to those below income and other poverty lines increases equity, a point 
discussed below -- I will not discuss the SES variant of “environmental justice” here. 
 11
the impacts on certain states (or other geographic units) is much higher than the impacts on other 
states (or units)? 
Political feasibility may require the policymaker to spread her mitigation resources 
equally across different geographic units – but that simply shows that politics may constrain the 
pursuit of normative goals like overall welfare or equity, not that equity means geographic 
equity.  On a more normative note: jurisdictions with smaller populations may be less well 
positioned to prepare for/respond to/recover from/mitigate hazards than jurisdictions with larger 
populations.  For example, it has been argued that: 
The immense power and resources of large settlements confer considerable resilience.  
Most major cities are able to harness massive financial resources and expertise … to 
combat disaster and to aid recovery – in many cases as part of the normal functioning of 
the city.  To varying degrees, this counters the potential increased vulnerability of 
megacities to certain types of hazards.  (Handmer 1995, 365, quoted in Cross 2001, 77) 
Thus, expending governmental resources on small communities out of proportion to their 
populations may sometimes be cost-benefit justified.  The private and public goods normally 
supplied in cities -- big hospitals, extensive fire and police departments – may in some cases 
mean that additional expenditures for hazard mitigation/preparedness/response/recovery are less 
cost-effective than in non-urban areas.  But that effect should, in principle, be captured by a 
sophisticated cost-benefit analysis; there’s no need for a separate geographic-equity analysis.   
Ditto for the point that hazards which hit smaller communities are likelier to entirely 
disrupt community life – with special costs – than hazards which hit cities.  If there are extra 
costs to the wholesale rather than partial disruption of a community, then cost-benefit analysis 
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should capture those costs and – without more – would warrant special attention for smaller 
communities. 
 What about the equity accounts that focus on the distribution of natural hazards across 
racial groups?  There are many subtle issues to be untangled here.  To begin, a disparate impact 
test may be used to smoke out conscious or unconscious racial discrimination.  The fact that a 
particular state government agency regularly pursues mitigation policies that disproportionately 
benefit whites should raise a red flag for federal overseers.  Are the state decisionmakers 
consciously or unconsciously discounting the interests of nonwhites?  Further, racial minorities 
may be especially vulnerable to natural hazards – either because minority groups are 
disproportionately poor, or independent of that.  (For example, if “redlining” practices mean that 
racial minorities in certain communities tend to be underinsured, and therefore tend to take fewer 
individual mitigation measures, mitigation dollars spent in these communities would tend to have 
a greater benefit.) (Fothergill et al. 1999; Peacock et al. 1997, 171-90)  Finally, the visible 
existence of policies that disparately affect minorities – for example, the clustering of hazardous 
waste dumps in inner-city neighborhoods, or a failure of rescuers to do much for hurricane 
refugees in such neighborhoods – may have substantial costs in terms of racial divisiveness, or in 
enhancing the “social exclusion” of certain minority-group members.  (Sunstein 1994) 
This analysis suggests that race-based equity should not be a concern for a genuinely 
impartial and sophisticated social planner.  Divisiveness costs and social exclusion costs are 
effects on individuals, and will be incorporated in a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis or 
sophisticated individualistic equity analysis, as will the enhanced vulnerability of members of 
certain racial groups. Race-based tests will also evidence the motivations of other actors; but the 
well-meaning social planner won’t need to police her own motivations. 
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In our present circumstances, where techniques for quantifying costs such as racial 
division and social exclusion are still undeveloped, race-based tests plausibly function as 
practicable decision procedures that supplement cost-benefit analysis and individualistic equity 
analysis.  The same may even be true of geographic equity tests.  Still, it is hard to see why the 
normative criterion of equity should itself be group-based, any more than the criterion of overall 
welfare.  Groups don’t have interests apart from the interests of the individuals who comprise 
them.  Avoiding disruption to groups, or disparate effects on groups, may be important in 
preventing harms to the groups’ members – to the extent that members’ goals and plans are 
bound up with the groups, or that others in society see them as group members.  But the notion 
of protecting groups per se, let alone defining a basic moral construct such as equity in group-
based rather than individualistic terms, is extremely puzzling. 
Individualistic Equity: Ex Post or Ex Ante? 
 For the remainder of the paper I will focus on individualistic construals of equity: views 
that constrain the distribution of some item across individuals.  Within this broad family of 
views, we might distinguish, first, between ex ante and ex post approaches to equity.  The 
distinction is subtle but very important.  Imagine that the item for distribution is income, and that 
the view is noncomparative.  In particular, it seeks to ensure that everyone is above some 
threshold.  The ex post variant of this approach would seek to ensure that everyone’s actual 
income is above some threshold; the ex ante variant would instead define a threshold of expected 
income.  (Morduch 1994) 
 The distinction persists if we shift to a comparative, income-based view.  Comparativists 
want to equalize rather than raise everyone above a threshold. But what’s being equalized: actual 
income or expected income?   
 14
 Shift, now, to a different currency: life.  Consider first the threshold view using this 
currency.  The ex ante version of that view seeks to ensure that no one’s risk of death is too high.  
Indeed, this view is reflected in much toxics regulation; agencies such as EPA, OSHA, or the 
FDA often determine whether the exposure of the population to a given toxin is “safe” by asking 
whether maximally or highly exposed individuals would incur an incremental fatality risk above 
some numerical threshold (such as a 1 in 1 million, 1 in 100,000, 1 in 10,000, or 1 in 1000 
incremental fatality risk).  (Adler 2005)  By contrast, the ex post version of the view that uses life 
as its currency, and that cares about thresholds, would try to avoid deaths that occur before a 
certain age – be it a fairly young age (18), or an intermediate age (40), or an substantial age (70), 
or a very advanced age (100).5  The first choice would be the ex post analogue of an ex ante view 
that sets a fairly high fatality risk threshold; the last choice would be the analogue of setting a 
very low risk threshold (1 in 1 million) and would be virtually equivalent to a policy of 
minimizing all deaths. 
 Clearly, the ex ante approach of minimizing the number of individuals whose risk of 
death exceeds some threshold, and the ex post approach of minimizing the number of deaths, can 
diverge.  This divergence, indeed, is a recurrent theme within the literature on equity in the 
regulation of human hazards, and connects to discussions of geographic equity.  (Adler 2005;  
Adler 2003, 1423-36; Finkel 1996)  A central question in this literature is whether policymakers 
should aim to reduce “individual risk” (an ex ante approach) or “population risk,” i.e., the total 
number of deaths (an ex post approach).  Imagine that EPA can choose to remedy a rural waste 
dump with a high concentration of dangerous chemicals, which exposes 10,000 individuals to a 1 
                                                 
5 More precisely, these age thresholds would emerge from a combination of (1) using longevity as the currency for 
equity; (2) adopting an ex post rather than ex ante approach; and (3) using whole lifetimes rather than periods or 
moments as the temporal framework for measuring individual “holdings” of the currency.   This last issue is 
discussed below, in the section on comparative and noncomparative views. 
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in 10,000 incremental fatality risk; or instead to clean up an urban waste dump with a lower 
concentration of dangerous chemicals, which exposes 8 million individuals to a 1 in 2 million 
incremental fatality risk.  The first policy mitigates many high risks but saves fewer lives; the 
second mitigates no risks above even a low threshold, but saves more lives. 
 If we kept the “currency” fixed, but focused on equalizing rather than raising above 
thresholds, a similar divergence would arise.  The ex ante planner focuses on equalizing the 
distribution of fatality risks from some source; the ex post planner focuses on regulating the 
source so that the resultant distribution of longevity is more equal.  
 A final example of the divergence between ex ante and ex post approaches -- now using 
the currency of welfare itself, rather than income or life.  A simple case will show how the two 
can diverge here.  The policymaker for a society of N individuals is choosing between the status 
quo, where everyone’s welfare is at utility level 100, and a policy which will moderately 
improve the welfare of 90% of the society (raising them to level 110) and dramatically decrease 
the welfare of 10% (lowering them to level 20).  The identity of the 10% is unknown. The ex 
ante policy maker definitely approves this choice:  Everyone’s ex ante utility increases from 100 
to 101 and equality of ex ante utilities is preserved.  But the ex post policy maker may decline 
the policy, because in each state of the world it would produce a highly skewed outcome, with   
10% of the society dramatically worse off than the remainder.   
 It might be thought equity analysis inevitably adopts an ex ante approach, given 
uncertainty on the part of the policymaker.  This is incorrect. Both approaches are consistent 
with policymaker uncertainty.  The difference concerns the stage at which uncertainty enters the 
equity analysis.  The ex post approach views equity as a feature of the possible outcomes of 
policy choice.   Assume that Cj (Oi) is individual j’s holding of the relevant currency for equity in 
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outcome Oi and that there are N individuals in the population. For a given policy, the ex post 
analyst: (1) identifies the possible outcomes {O1 .. OM} of the policy; (2) performs an equity 
analysis for each outcome Oi, examining the distribution of the relevant currency (e.g., income, 
life, well-being) in that outcome; (3) ideally, summarizes the equity status of each outcome Oi 
with a number E(Oi) = E(C1(Oi), C2(Oi), … Cj(Oi), … CN(Oi)), which represents how equitable 
the distribution of the currency in that outcome is; and (4) determines the expected equity of the 
policy as ∑ piE(Oi), where pi is the probability of outcome Oi.  By contrast, the ex ante analyst: 
(1) identifies the possible outcomes {O1 … OM} of the policy; (2) determines, for each individual 
j, her expected value of the relevant currency, that is, ∑pi Cj(Oi); and (3) performs an equity 
analysis on these N individual expected values.  In short, the ex post approach to equity estimates 
the degree of inequity in each policy outcome, and then (discounting each outcome by its 
probability) estimates the expected degree of inequity; the ex ante approach determines each 
individual’s expectation from the policy (expected income, expected utility, risk of death) and 
then determines the degree of inequity of these expectations.  
 Which approach to equity, ex ante or ex post, is more appealing?  Interestingly, the 
question has been largely overlooked by philosophers of distributive justice; but it has been 
examined by a body of scholarly work in welfare economics, with no clear resolution.  (Broome 
1984; Diamond 1967; Hammond 1982; Mongin and d’Aspremont 1998, 437-44)  The best 
argument for the ex post approach, one that seems (to this author) pretty compelling, is that 
morality is ultimately a matter of producing good outcomes.  Poverty means being poor – not 
having an expectation of a low income or utility.  Psychological trauma means experiencing 
mental illness or suffering – not having the expectation of mental illness or suffering.   
Normative criteria, such as equity, are applicable to the consequences or outcomes of our choices 
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– to what might actually occur as a result of the policies society chooses or refrains from 
choosing.  In other words, the ex post approach to equity sits naturally with a “consequentialist” 
approach to policy choice.  (Scheffler 1988)   To put the point more technically: the so-called 
“sure thing” principle, an intuitively appealing principle of rationality, leads to the ex post 
approach.6  
 These are difficult matters, and the reader not already familiar with the social choice 
literature on ex ante versus ex post approaches to policy choice may be more puzzled than 
enlightened.  Suffice it to say that the ex post approach views inequity as a property of the 
outcomes or consequences of policy choice, not of individual expectations; and that there are 
strong arguments in favor of this approach.  More concretely: if equity cares about raising 
individuals above some threshold (as I will argue it minimally does), then the threshold should 
be defined in terms of individuals’ actual holdings of some “currency,” not individuals’ risks or 
expectations.  Consider the exemplary case where the policymaker has to choose between 
mitigating a high probability natural hazard that imposes a high risk of fatality, serious injury, 
psychological trauma, and other sorts of serious deprivation on each member of a small 
population; or a lower probability natural hazard that imposes a low risk of fatality, injury, 
trauma, and other such serious deprivation on each member of a large population, but with a 
higher expected number of fatalities, serious injuries, psychological trauma cases, and other 
instances of serious deprivation.  Then the ex ante approach will argue for mitigating the first 
hazard, while the ex post approach will argue for mitigating the second.    
                                                 
6 Think of policies as probabilistic packages, or lotteries, of outcomes – lotteries that produce different outcomes 
depending on which one of a plurality of possible conditions in the world or contingencies actually obtains. Then the 
sure thing principle says that the policymaker’s ranking of two lotteries that produce the same or equally good 
outcomes on a given contingency should remain the same if we merely swap those outcomes for another pair of 
identical or equally good outcomes or change the probability of the contingency.  In effect, indifferent outcomes or 
the probability of indifferent outcomes should make no difference to policy choice. 
 18
What is the Currency for Individualistic Equity? 
 I have argued that equity is “individualistic” and ex post in its structure.  Equity analysis 
should determine the possible outcomes of a policy choice and, for each outcome Oi, should 
evaluate the distribution across individuals – not groups – of the relevant items.  But which items 
are those?   What is the “currency” of equity?  (Arneson 2000) 
 One policy area where issues of equity and distributive justice have been salient concerns 
the alleviation of poverty. Economists have traditionally conceptualized poverty as a low level of 
income or expenditure.  (Laderchi et al. 2003)  The problem with these “currencies” is that they 
track well-being quite imperfectly.  As Amartya Sen argues:   
 Our physical and social characteristics make us immensely diverse creatures.  We differ 
in age, sex, physical and mental health, bodily prowess, intellectual abilities, climactic 
circumstances, epidemiological vulnerability, social surroundings, and in many other 
respects. Such diversities ...can be hard to accommodate adequately in the usual . . .  
framework of inequality assessment.  (Sen 1992, 28) 
Consider the “currency” of expenditure.  The fact that P’s expenditure level is greater than Q’s 
doesn’t mean that P is better off than Q, all things considered.  P may be physically disabled; he 
may need a high level of expenditure to facilitate activities that Q can perform effortlessly, such 
as locomotion.  Or, P and Q may both be physically able but Q may benefit from various public 
goods (she lives in a cleaner or sunnier climate), or a sunnier disposition, or a bigger circle of 
friends, that compensate for her lower level of expenditure.  
Similar points can be made about the inadequacy of income as a “currency” for 
measuring deprivation and, more generally, equity  – at least if income is defined in a 
straightforward and readily measurable way as cash income (wage, investment, and transfer 
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income).7  Those with higher cash incomes tend to be better off than those with lower incomes, 
but the correlation is far from perfect.  An individual’s well-being is the upshot of her choices in 
expending her income on marketed goods plus her physical and mental state and her access to 
nonmarket goods. 
In the literature on environmental and technological risk, a different “currency” tends to 
be used for discussions of equity: the risk of death.  (Adler 2005; Adler 2003, 1414-36)  A policy 
that leaves some individuals with an above-threshold risk of dying as a result of some hazard (a 1 
in 1 million, 1 in 100,000, 1 in 10,000, or 1 in 1000 risk, say), or that produces a skewed 
distribution in the risk of death from the hazard, is seen as inequitable.  This approach is doubly 
problematic.  First, as already discussed, it takes an ex ante approach to equity, focusing on each 
individual’s expectation of premature death rather than on the actual occurrence of premature 
death.  Second, and additionally, the “currency” of death or the risk of death is too narrow.  
Hazards – natural as well as human – produce a range of bad outcomes: not just death, but also 
non-fatal injury and disease, the loss of income and expenditure, unemployment, psychological 
trauma, and the disruption of family and community life.  Policy analysis of 
preparedness/response/recovery/mitigation measures – both equity analysis and cost-benefit 
analysis -- should, in principle, capture all of these dimensions, not just the life/death dimension.  
Clearly this is true for cost-benefit analysis (whether understood as a tool for 
implementing the criterion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, or a tool for implementing the criterion of 
overall welfare).  Cost-benefit analysis aims to aggregate willingness-to-pay for all the welfare-
relevant aspects of a policy, not just its effect on premature death.  But it is no less true for equity 
                                                 
7 Income might be declined more inclusively, to encompass the money value of services from durable goods, 
consumption paid for by the government, home production, time spent in leisure rather than work, and even the 
consumption of public goods.  “Income” thus defined would correlate better with well-being than does cash income, 
although not perfectly given differences in individuals’ physical and mental conditions.  In any event, scholarship on 
“income” inequality typically does not use this sort of inclusive construct.  (Bojer 2003, 65-77) 
 20
analysis.  Consider a natural hazards policy that focuses on warning and evacuation, with little 
effort given to strengthening structures or to recovery.  This policy might be very effective in 
preventing fatalities, but would fail to prevent the host of serious non-fatality setbacks that occur 
when individual homes and a community’s infrastructure are destroyed. In general, to its credit, 
the existing literature on natural hazards policy recognizes that good analysis should be inclusive 
in characterizing the impacts of hazards.  (Cochrane 1975; Ewing et al. 2005; Heinz Center 
2000; Mileti 1999) 
 So what should the “currency” for natural hazards equity analysis be? In principle, I 
suggest, the answer is well-being itself – not merely particular components of well-being, or 
particular preconditions for well-being, or particular resources that facilitate well-being, such as 
income or life.  One objection to this approach is that well-being is subjective. Different 
individuals have different conceptions of well-being. Although this is surely true, well-being is 
objective to the extent that conceptions overlap. (Smith 1994, 173)  If there were no overlap, 
how could there be any “currency” for equity analysis?  But, in truth, virtually all of us have 
conceptions of well-being that view life and income as intrinsically or instrumentally valuable.  
Similarly, virtually all of us have conceptions of well-being that view physical and psychological 
health, social interaction rather than isolation, meaningful employment, and other such items (not 
captured by the income and longevity “currencies”) as intrinsically or instrumentally valuable.   
 A different critique of the welfare “currency,” advanced by some philosophers, is that 
equity requires an equitable distribution of opportunities for well-being – not well-being itself.  
(Arneson 2000)  After all, some individuals will end up with a low level of well-being because of 
their own choices; others, because of bad luck.  Surely these two sorts of individuals should be 
treated differently by equity analysis.  The answer to this point is twofold.  First, equity analysis 
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should in principle integrate considerations of choice and responsibility – but we don’t yet have 
the practicable tools to do that.  (Laderchi 2003, 255) Second, and more to the point, the 
choice/responsibility criticism hardly argues for a narrow rather than more inclusive currency.  If 
we try to ensure that no one has a low income, or dies prematurely, then we will be aiding some 
individuals who are responsible for their deprivation (those who have squandered their resources, 
or knowingly engaged in risky activities), no less so than if we aim to ensure that no one is 
psychologically traumatized, socially isolated, or unemployed. 
 So what, then, is human welfare?  What are the components of an individual’s life that, 
most of us will agree, contribute to the well-being of that individual?  This sort of question can 
be answered more or less systematically, through reflection, or discussion, or surveys.  The 
World Health Organization has recently undertaken an impressively systematic effort to answer 
the question, organizing focus groups and surveys in many different countries to arrive at a list of 
the components of “quality of life” and a matching survey instrument that can be used to inform 
governmental policymaking, both in the health care field and perhaps in other fields too, as well 
as decisions by medical professionals and other private actors.  (Szabo 1996; The WHOQOL 
Group 1998; Bonomi et al. 2000)  The WHOQOL list consists of 24 “facets” or dimensions, 
organized into 6 domains. 
WHOQOL Quality of Life Framework 
Physical 
Domain 
Psychological 
Domain 
Independence 
Domain 
Social 
Domain 
Environment 
Domain 
Spiritual 
Domain 
Pain and 
Discomfort 
Positive 
Feelings 
Mobility Personal 
Relationships 
Physical Safety 
and Security 
Spirituality 
 Energy and 
Fatigue 
Thinking, 
Learning, 
Memory and 
Concentration 
Activities of 
Daily Living 
Social 
Support 
Home 
Environment 
 
Sleep and 
Rest 
Self-Esteem Dependence 
on Medication 
Sexual 
Activity 
Financial 
Resources 
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or Treatments 
 Body Image 
and 
Appearance 
Working 
Capacity 
 Health and Social 
Care: Availability 
and Quality 
 
 Negative 
Feelings 
  Opportunities for 
Acquiring New 
Information and 
Skills 
 
    Participation in 
and New 
Opportunities for 
Recreation/Leisure 
 
    Physical 
Environment 
 
    Transport  
 
The philosopher Martha Nussbaum has for some time been intensively engaged in a broadly 
similar effort to define a list of the constituents of the quality of life that could guide 
governmental decisions – in particular, the definition of a “social minimum” that every citizen is 
entitled to. 
   Nussbaum’s List of Central Human Capabilities 
   1. Life 
   2. Bodily health 
   3. Bodily integrity 
   4. Senses, imagination and thought 
   5. Emotions  
6.  Practical reason (“being able to form a conception of the good and to 
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life”) 
7. Affiliation (both “being able to live with and towards others” and 
“[h]aving the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation”) 
 8. Other species 
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 9. Play 
 10. Control over one’s environment (both “being able to participate 
effectively in political choices” and “being able to hold property”) 
 
(Nussbaum 2000, 78-80)  Nussbaum’s list and the WHOQOL list are presented here, not as the 
definitive lists of the constituents of well-being, but rather as particularly comprehensive and 
carefully constructed examples of this sort of list.  Numerous other examples can be found in the 
philosophical and economic literatures. (Alkire 2002, 78-84)  A meta-analysis of this literature 
would be one plausible way to generate a consensus list of the dimensions of well-being that a 
governmental agency could employ in policymaking, including equity analysis. 
 There are two apparent difficulties with the proposal that equity analysis should employ 
the currency of well-being, as identified by the sort of multi-dimensional list of the different 
constituents of welfare that the WHOQOL framework and Nussbaum’s list exemplify.  One 
difficulty is commensurability – integrating the different dimensions into a single measure of 
well-being.  Let me bracket this problem for the moment, to return to it in the next section. 
 The other problem is the sheer multiplicity of the dimensions.  Consider the WHOQOL 
list.  None of the dimensions is inherently unmeasurable, but many are difficult to measure, and 
the decision costs of evaluating policies with respect to all 24 of the WHOQOL dimensions 
would be overwhelming. 
 The answer is that equity analysis should be sensitive to ease of measurement and to the 
related problem of decision costs.  Equity analysts may need to make rough and ready, threshold 
assessments about which dimensions are worth quantifying – depending both on expected 
measurement costs, and the likelihood that measurement will provide choice-relevant 
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information (that is, lead the policy maker to adopt a different policy than she would have absent 
the measurement).  Relatedly, analysts will sometimes find it cost-effective to use proxy 
variables for certain dimensions or sets of dimensions: items that are not themselves an intrinsic 
component of well-being but are readily measurable and correlate with certain aspects of well-
being. 
In many instances this sort of threshold assessment will suggest that a variety of 
dimensions should be quantified and, in particular, that focusing on the traditional equity 
currencies of income and risk/longevity is too limited.  Consider, by way of analogy, cost-benefit 
analysis of environmental policies, where a variety of welfare effects are now routinely included 
in analyses, in particular, health, visibility, water quality, and recreational values, along with 
changes in consumption and fatality risks.  (Cropper 2000)  
 An even closer analogy is the scholarly literature in development economics, inspired by 
Amartya Sen’s work, which seeks to use a plurality of “functionings”8 (in effect, particular 
aspects of well-being or proxy variables for such aspects) rather than income as the scales of 
poverty and development.  (Alkire 2002; Balestrino 1996; Fukuda-Parr 2003; Kuklys 2005; 
Klasen 2000; Laderchi 2003; Qizilbash 2002)  To give one illustrative example: Stephan Klasen 
measured the extent of poverty in a sample of South African households in two ways: first, by 
determining each household’s expenditures; second, by measuring each household’s 
achievement with respect to 14 different functionings: education, income, wealth, housing, 
water, sanitation, energy, employment, transport, access to financial services, nutrition, health 
care, safety, and perceived well-being.  A household achievement with respect to each 
                                                 
8 Sen argues that the currency for equality should be “capabilities,” which are opportunities to achieve 
“functionings.”  (Sen 1992)   In practice, much of the Sen-inspired work in development economics has used 
“functionings” not “capabilities,” given the difficulty of measuring opportunities.  (Laderchi 2003, 255)  I therefore 
generally use the term “functioning” in discussing the Sen-inspired approach. 
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functioning was quantified using a measurable indicator.  For example, the indicator for 
education was the average years of schooling of adult household members; the indicator for 
sanitation was the type of facility in the household, from no toilet at all to indoor flush toilet, 
ranked 1 to 5.  An overall functioning for the household was determining by averaging the 14 
components.   A household was judged seriously impoverished with respect to expenditures if its 
expenditures were below the 20th percentile, and seriously impoverished with respect to 
functionings if its overall functioning was below the 20th percentile. Klasen found that the 
expenditure- and functioning-based analyses gave quite different pictures of the extent and 
distribution of poverty in South Africa. 
 Individualistic Equity: Comparative or Noncomparative? 
 A very important distinction evident within the philosophical literature on equality is the 
distinction between comparative and noncomparative accounts. (Clayton and Williams 2000; 
Crisp 2003; Frankfurt 1987; Symposium 2003)  Assume welfare is the “currency” for equity – as 
I’ve argued it should be.  The comparativist, then, cares about the overall pattern of welfare 
levels.  Her concern is how individual P fares, as compared to Q and R and S and so on.  The 
noncomparativist does not have this concern: rather, her view is that improvements in someone’s 
welfare become more important, morally speaking, the lower that person’s overall level of 
welfare.  In effect, the comparativist has a fairness-based view of equity, while the 
noncomparativist has an urgency-based view.  More formally, the noncomparativist’s ranking of 
outcomes is “separable” in individual welfares, while the comparativist’s is not.9
                                                 
9 A ranking of outcomes is separable in individual welfares if the ranking of any two outcomes is independent of the 
welfare levels of “indifferent” individuals – those not affected by the choice.   Imagine a population of 5 individuals.  
I will now construct an example in which the last 2 individuals are “indifferent.”  In outcome x, the welfare levels 
are (4, 10, 18, 20, 20); in y they are (6, 6, 20, 20, 20); in z they are (4, 10, 18, 6, 6); in w they are (6, 6, 20, 6, 6).  
Then “separability” means that x is ranked as more equitable than y if and only if z is ranked as more equitable than 
w.    
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 Intuitions pull in both directions.  Further, existing practices of measuring equity are 
sometimes comparativist, sometimes noncomparativist in spirit.  For example, the popular “Gini 
coefficient,” often used to evaluate the distribution of income, is a comparativist measure.   By 
contrast, evaluating a income distribution by counting the number of individuals below a poverty 
line trades on the noncomparativist idea that it is particularly morally urgent to benefit 
individuals who are very badly off.  (Bojer 2003, 92-106, 118-22) 
 Are we at an impasse?  Maybe not.  Some progress can be made by seeing that a transfer 
of a fixed amount of well-being from an individual who is well off to one who is below some 
threshold of well-being will be counted as an equity improvement both by comparativists and by 
noncomparativists.10  To begin, comparativists should agree that such a “Robin Hood” transfer 
improves the equity pattern.  (If it doesn’t – if reverse-Robin Hood transfers are seen as possibly 
improving the overall pattern – then the theorist can hardly be said to care about equity.)  
Further, noncomparativists may disagree about whether effects on well-being have variable 
weight above a threshold of poverty, but at a minimum they will surely agree that increments to 
the well-being of someone below such a threshold are more urgent than decrements to the well-
being of someone above it. 
 In short, a noncomparative, threshold approach that quantifies the extent to which 
individuals lie below some “poverty line” of well-being should be the core of any equity 
analysis.  Specific views of equity may require further analysis, but every equity theorist would 
presumably agree that, holding overall welfare constant, measures that benefit those below the 
                                                 
10 This is a weakened version of the “Pigou-Dalton” condition popular among economists who study inequality.   
 The standard version of that condition, with well-being as the currency, says that the transfer of a fixed amount of 
well-being from someone who is better off to someone who is worse off increases equity.  (Tungodden 2003, 19)  
On the standard view, any equity-regarding social welfare function must satisfy the Pigou-Dalton condition; further 
distinctions can then be delineated within the set of Pigou-Dalton respecting functions, for example between 
functions that are separable in individual welfares and those that are not.   My weakening of the Pigou-Dalton 
condition allows for the plausible view that fixed transfers above a poverty line have no impact on equity. 
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poverty line are good policies.11  To be clear, I use the term “poverty” as a term of art, to mean 
the deprivation of well-being.   “Poverty” in the vernacular, meaning income poverty, is only one 
aspect of well-being poverty, for reasons already discussed.    Equity analysis should, at a 
minimum, quantify the effect of natural hazards policies on well-being poverty.  That is the 
essence of my recommendation.  
 Many complexities remain, to be resolved through further discussion, surveys, and 
technical work.  One important question is whether to set a single all-dimensions-considered 
well-being poverty line, or rather poverty lines for each of the measured welfare dimensions.  
The first approach is more theoretically compelling, but more demanding in terms of 
measurement. The notion of an interpersonally comparable utility scale is, I believe, a coherent 
one, but we as yet lack a practicable set of tools for readily operationalizing this scale in 
policymaking. 
 Assuming the disaggregated approach is pursued, the problem of setting dimension-
specific poverty lines arises.  Since poverty lines, as described here, are meant to represent a kind 
of “overlapping consensus” across equity theories, the relevant line should be calibrated so as to 
capture the point of substantial deprivation – that point such that moving someone above the line, 
at the expense of someone who is well off, would be seen as an equity improvement by virtually 
all equity theorists.  In principle, the poverty line should be absolute rather than relative – 
because it is meant to appeal to noncomparativists who are concerned with absolute deprivation, 
and not merely comparativists who focus on relative welfare.  But some goods, most clearly 
social status, are intrinsically relational.  The income poverty line understood as a proxy variable 
for social status will be relative, not absolute; if your income is only a small fraction of your 
                                                 
11 By this I mean measures that, holding overall welfare constant, benefit some below the poverty line and harm 
none below it, imposing costs only on those above it.  Measures that benefit some and harm others below the 
poverty line are a more controversial matter. 
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society’s median income, you are likely to be ostracized and feel shame, even if that income is 
sufficient to nourish, clothe and shelter you.  More generally, percentile, fraction-of-median, or 
other relative measures for many welfare dimensions will be a practicable way to set the poverty 
line in default of an implementable absolute threshold.   (Qizilbash 2002, 758-59; Bojer 2003, 
118-20) 
 A third and related problem is that of specifying the time period for measuring 
achievement with respect to a given dimension of well-being.   (McKerlie 1989; Temkin 1993, 
232-44)  The literature on income distribution is relevant. Should we evaluate the distribution of 
lifetime income or of periodic (for example, annual) income?   (Bojer 2003, 74-76, 90-91) 
Generally scholarship takes the latter approach, because lifetime values are hard to measure.  The 
same would be true for measuring non-income welfare dimensions.  For many dimensions, the 
simplest approach would be momentary rather than lifetime or periodic.  Being in a state of 
seriously bad health at any time counts as a momentary deprivation of health; being homeless at 
any time counts as a momentary deprivation of shelter; being unemployed at any time counts as a 
momentary deprivation of meaningful work; being seriously psychologically traumatized at any 
time counts as a momentary deprivation of mental health; being hungry at any time counts as a 
momentary deprivation of nourishment; living without any social support at a time counts as a 
momentary deprivation of social support.  Total bad health, homelessness, unemployment, etc., 
is then (most straightforwardly) a matter of the total time in which individuals are in the deprived 
state.12  Life can be handled in a related manner: not being alive counts as a momentary 
                                                 
12To be sure, this kind of simple aggregate measure for dimension-specific poverty could be refined where there are 
equity-relevant differences among those below the line.  This is not true for death: everyone not alive at a moment is 
equally dead then.  But it is clearly true for bad health: among the universe of serious health conditions, some are 
worse than others and presumably generate stronger redistributive claims.  
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deprivation of life, and the change in total longevity resulting from a policy is a measure of its 
equity effect on the life dimension.13
 A fourth issue is how to handle uncertainty.  For a simple illustration of the issues, 
assume that we have two welfare dimensions, f and g. We are choosing between a status quo S 
and a policy with two possible outcomes O and O*.  f(_) is the extent of deprivation with respect 
to f in the given outcome; similarly for g(__).  Probabilities p and (1-p) are the probabilities of O 
and O*, respectively, if the policy is chosen.  The ex post approach to equity says that we should 
measure overall poverty in each outcome as a function of f-deprivation and g-deprivation, and 
then discount by outcome probabilities to determine expected equity. Formally, E(f(_), g(_)) 
measures overall poverty in the outcome.  The status quo has equity measure E(f(S), g(S)); the 
policy has an equity measure equaling its expected equity pE(f(O), g(O)) + (1-p)E(f(O*), g(O*)).   
If the function E is assumed to be roughly linear, then we can separate out the two 
dimensions.  Imagine that E(f(_), g(__)) = kf f(__) + kgg(__). Then the expected equity of the 
policy is p [kf f(O) + kg g(O)] + (1-p) [kf f(O*) + kg g(O*)] = kf [p f(O) + (1-p) f(O*)] + kg [p 
g(O) + (1-p) g (O*)].  In other words, the expected equity of the policy is the weighted sum of 
the expected measures with respect to the two welfare dimensions.14  More generally, if overall 
poverty in an outcome is approximately a linear function of poverty with respect to the 
underlying dimensions, equity analysis of a given policy can proceed by determining the change 
in expected poverty produced by the policy for each dimension, and then aggregating these 
                                                 
13Using lifetimes as the relevant time period for measuring well-being achievements with respect to the “life” 
dimension means measuring the equity impact of a policy as the change in the number of deaths that occur before 
some age threshold.  By contrast, using moments as the equity period means measuring the change in longevity  (the 
total years that individuals are alive.)   On this approach, each increment to longevity relieves a momentary 
deprivation.  
14 This should not be confused with the ex ante approach criticized earlier, which uses individuals’ expectations as 
the basis for equity policy.  Rather, the idea is that, under conditions of linearity,  the expected overall ex post 
poverty arising from a policy is just the same as the weighted sum of the expected amount of poverty for each well-
being dimension.  The expectations being summed are not individual’s expected utilities or expected holdings in 
some other currency, but the expected amount of poverty for each dimension.  
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values using weighting factors to produce an overall equity score for the policy.   Concretely: if 
the equity analysis measures deprivations with respect to the six dimensions of (say) longevity, 
hunger, homelessness, serious disease or injury, unemployment, and psychological trauma, then 
she will ideally establish weighting factors for these dimensions.  Through reflection, discussion, 
or surveys, she will need to establish the equity importance of a day spent hungry, as compared 
to a day spent homeless, in a serious disease or injury state, unemployed, in a state of 
psychological trauma or (at the extreme) a day in which the subject is not alive at all.  Equity 
analysis of a natural hazards policy will then consist in: (1) estimating the change in the expected 
amount of longevity, hunger, homelessness, serious disease or injury, unemployment, and 
psychological trauma, as produced by the policy relative to the status quo; and (2) applying the 
weighting factors to these quantities and aggregating. 
Conclusion 
 Through normative argument, we can make progress in understanding what equity 
analysis for natural hazards policy should involve.  There is no reason to think that equity 
analysis is wholly subjective or political, any more than cost-benefit analysis – although of 
course in both cases any governmental decision is ultimately subject to political control through 
the legislative process.  The focus of equity analysis, I have argued, should be well-being 
poverty:  serious deprivations with respect to any dimension of well-being.   Well-being should 
be the basic “currency” for equity analysis – not fatality risk, income, or other such traditional 
currencies. Analysts should start with a basic list of well-being dimensions.   The WHOQOL’s 
list and Nussbaum’s list are reasonable places to start, but there are other plausible lists in the 
literature as well, and one possibility is to meta-analyze this literature to produce a consensus 
list.   Once a list of well-being dimensions is in place, a rough-and-ready “value of information” 
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approach should be used to decide whether to include a given dimension in the analysis: the 
dimension should be included if doing so seems likely to make a difference to the analysis, and if 
the dimension can be measured (directly or with proxy variables) sufficiently easily given the 
stakes of the policy decision at hand.   A “poverty line” needs to be set for each included 
dimension.  This should in principle involve absolute, not relative poverty – for it is meant to 
represent the point of “overlapping consensus” among virtually all equity theorists, 
noncomparativist as well as comparativist – and, relatedly, should involve a serious deprivation 
(not just the absence of full flourishing).  It should be the point at which individual claims 
become sufficiently urgent that overall-well-being-preserving transfers to individuals below the 
line, from those above, is – fairly uncontroversially -- good policy. 
 The equity analyst will also need to develop some sense of how the amounts of poverty 
along each well-being dimension, in a given outcome, interact to produce the overall degree of 
poverty in that outcome.  Assuming the interaction is roughly linear, then equity analysis will 
have the following, simple structure: first assess the policy’s expected impact with respect to 
each dimension, then weight and aggregate to determine an overall equity score for the policy.     
Concretely, this would mean predicting the extent to which the policy can be expected to 
increase longevity, reduce serious injury, stop serious psychological trauma, prevent hunger or 
homelessness, lessen unemployment, prevent family breakdown, and reduce other such instances 
of serious well-being deprivation that typically accompany natural hazards – and then weighting 
and aggregating these poverty-reduction benefits.   More generally, whatever specific 
dimensions are included, and whatever assumptions are made about the interaction of those 
dimensions, the basic thrust of equity analysis should be to quantify the change in expected well-
being poverty produced by each policy under consideration. 
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 Because this proposal departs from the accounts of equity common in the human hazards 
literature – in adopting an ex post rather than ex ante focus, and using well-being not fatalities as 
the currency – it may strike some readers as very odd.  Suffice it to say that the proposal draws 
on a growing body of scholarship in development economics, inspired by Amartya Sen’s 
scholarship, and that the implementation of equity analysis would also benefit from that 
scholarship – for example, in identifying dimensions and drawing poverty lines.  
 Clearly, even if this general approach is adopted, there is much room for debate and 
argument, in three areas: (1) further specifying the approach (identifying dimensions, poverty 
lines, methodologies for measuring dimension-specific poverties, and weights for the 
dimensions); (2) determining whether other sorts of equity analyses should also be performed 
(e.g., a Gini-type analysis, which comparativists might approve but noncomparativists will not); 
and (3) determining how to “balance” the results of cost-benefit analysis and equity analysis.   
But structured argument is different from an undisciplined “value choice.”   Whether because of 
global warming, meteorological or seismic cycles, or burgeoning populations in hurricane- and 
earthquake-prone areas, we seem to be entering a period when natural hazards will command 
national attention and resources as never before.   It should be possible to bring some intellectual 
rigor and structure to the expenditure of those resources – not just at the stage of maximizing 
overall well-being/efficiency, but also at the stage of determining what an “equitable” 
expenditure would be.  
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